Pushkar Mande
On April 17, 2025, a significant U.S. military strike on Yemen’s Ras Isa oil terminal shows up the expanding maritime dimension of the Israel-Hamas conflict. The Houthi campaign, outlined as solidarity with Gaza.
The U.S. response beginning with the re-designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 22, 2025, followed by “Operation Rough Rider” airstrikes since March 15 aims to choke off Houthi revenues but risks further maritime retaliations, higher insurance premiums, and long rerouting around Africa.
Regional powers from Iran to India are now deeply engaged, Tehran promises material support for the Houthis, while New Delhi balances Operation Sankalp escort deployments with a 10-year Chabahar port pact.
Israel–Hamas War and the Houthi Maritime Campaign
On October 7, 2023, Hamas fighters launched a cross-border raid into southern Israel, resulting in approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths and the abduction of dozens of civilians. Israel’s subsequent air and ground attacking in Gaza has, by early 2025, claimed over 51,000 Palestinian lives many of them non-combatants and injured more than 116,000, according to Palestinian health authorities; Israeli military reports cite around 1,200 Israeli military and civilian fatalities.
Within weeks of October 7, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement began targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea, branding the strikes as acts of solidarity with Gaza. Between November 2023 and January 2025, they launched over 100 attacks including anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned surface vessels, and drones sinking two merchant ships and killing four sailors.
This campaign exposed roughly 9 percent of global seaborne oil flows via the Bab al Mandeb Strait and forced many shippers to detour around the Cape of Good Hope, dramatically raising voyage times and costs.
Historical Timeline of Key Maritime Incidents
| Nov 19, 2023 | First major strike: Drones and cruise missiles hit the Bahamas-flagged Galaxy Leader, hijacked 50 nm west of Hodeida. |
| Dec 30–31, 2023 | U.S. and U.K. naval forces conducted coordinated air and naval strikes on Houthi C2 and weapons facilities in Yemen. |
| Jan 22, 2025 | Houthis re-designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by President Trump triggering expanded sanctions on fuel-tax revenues. |
| Mar 12, 2025 | Houthi forces resumed Red Sea attacks after a brief pause during the Gaza ceasefire interlude. |
| Mar 15, 2025 | Launch of “Operation Rough Rider,” a sustained U.S. air and naval campaign against Houthi maritime strike capabilities. |
| Apr 17, 2025 | U.S. airstrike on Ras Isa oil terminal kills at least 58 and injures 126, destroying key fuel storage and tanker trucks. |
U.S. Campaign in Yemen
On January 22, 2025, the White House formally labelled Ansar Allah (the Houthis) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, imposing sweeping financial sanctions aimed at cutting off the group’s primary revenue stream fuel-tax charges that had generated hundreds of millions annually.
Beginning March 15, 2025, U.S. Central Command launched “Operation Rough Rider,” a series of precision air and naval strikes across Houthi-controlled governorates and Red Sea coastal facilities. By late April, the campaign had delivered over 250 airstrikes, reportedly killing 500–600 Houthi fighters and inflicting significant damage on radar sites, missile and drone launchers, and fuel infrastructure.
Source: Wikipedia
Strategic Significance of the Bab al Mandeb & Suez Corridor
The Bab al Mandeb Strait just 26 km wide at its narrowest connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and channels roughly 9 percent of global seaborne-traded petroleum and about 30 percent of container traffic bound for the Suez Canal. In 2018, an estimated 6.2 million barrels per day flowed through this route, underscoring its pivotal role for Eurasia–Europe energy security.
Also read: India-Pakistan Conflict Disrupts Trade – Ports on High Alert Amid Rising Tensions
The Suez Canal itself attracts some 12–15 percent of worldwide trade and about 30 percent of global container cargo, carrying over $1 trillion in goods annually. Includes roughly 9 percentof global seaborne oil flows (about 9.2 million barrels per day in early 2023) and around 8 percentof liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes.
Averages fifty to sixtyships transiting the canal daily, carrying an estimated $3 billion to $9 billion in cargo value. UNCTAD data showed transits through the canal fallen by up to 42 percent amid Houthi attacks forcing weekly container movements to drop by 67 percent at peak disruption.
War-risk financiers have slapped up to 50 percent surcharges on Red Sea transits particularly for vessels with U.S., U.K., or Israeli links reflecting insurers’ fear over repeated missile and drone threats. Even during temporary ceasefires, premiums have remained near record highs.
Faced with elevated risks and premiums, many shipping firms detour around the Cape of Good Hope, adding roughly 6,000 nautical miles and 10–14 days to voyages between Asia and Europe. This diversion increases fuel consumption by an estimated 200,000 barrels per day for tankers and drives up voyage costs by up to $1 million each way.
Extended Russia–Ukraine disruptions and Panama Canal droughts compound trade-route pressures, with UNCTAD estimating the combined effect drives shipping costs higher, exacerbates delays, and destabilizes food and energy markets in import-dependent regions.
International & Regional Responses
USA & UK
The U.S. continues carrier-strike-group deployments to the Red Sea, vowing “round-the-clock” strikes until Houthi attacks cease. The U.K. leads Operation Prosperity Guardian, contributing frigates such as HMS Diamond for armed escort, intelligence sharing, and air-to-air refuelling to shield merchant traffic.
Iran, China & Russia
Iran’s Foreign Ministry condemned the Ras Isa strike as “brutal aggression” and pledged support political and material for the Houthis, though Tehran has so far hold back from obvious military escalation. China and Russia both urged control, Beijing called for diplomatic negotiations to de-escalate, citing risks to China-Iran trade, while Moscow condemned Western strikes as threatening and called for dialogue.
India’s Dual Approach
In 2025, India has stressed free navigation in the Red Sea but kept a strategic distance from the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. Instead, under Operation Sankalp re-launched on December 14, 2023 it deployed Project 15B destroyers (INS Kolkata, Kochi, Mormugao, Chennai, Visakhapatnam) alongside P-8I Neptune maritime patrol aircraft to escort merchant ships through the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, while avoiding direct combat to limit escalation.
Simultaneously, New Delhi hardened ties with Tehran by signing a 10-year Chabahar port development and operation pact in May 2024 balancing its security role with strategic outreach to Iran.
Gazan Ceasefire Break & Maritime Pause
A cease fire brokered by Egypt and Qatar took effect January 15, 2025, with Hamas agreeing to release 33 hostages in phases linked to prisoner swaps and aid increases; Israel released 30 Palestinian prisoners per civilian hostage and 50 per soldier.
During the ceasefire’s first phase, Yemen’s Houthis suspended random Red Sea strikes targeting only Israeli-linked vessels resulting in a marked reduction of missile and drone threats and prompting minor insurance premium relief. However, the pause proved fragile, strikes resumed March 12 after the ceasefire expired and Israel resumed operations.
Strategic and Humanitarian Considerations
President Trump’s “flush-out” strategy combining FTO designation, financial sanctions, and dynamic strikes aims to cut Houthi economic lifelines without deploying ground troops. Critics warn the approach deepens Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, reports say sanctions have hindered fuel imports and aid deliveries, raised prices and forcing relief agencies to scale back. The U.N. warns that without humanitarian safeguards, aid for 19.5 million Yemenis could be severely affected.
U.S. lawmakers particularly Senate Democrats have pressed for transparency on civilian casualties and questioned the budgetary strain of endless armaments expenditures diverted from Indo-Pacific priorities. In the U.K., MPs have debated the legal authority for ongoing strikes, though the core coalition argues operations are “limited, necessary, and proportionate.”
Outlook & Conclusion
Without a permanent Gaza ceasefire or a complete Yemeni settlement, Houthi maritime strikes are likely to continue and possibly expand their geographic reach into the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean via longer-range drones and sea-skimming missiles.
Each retaliation risks pushing more vessels around Africa, keeping insurance premiums raised, and stretching naval escorts. Moreover, the conflict’s maritime dimension invites deeper involvement by regional powers, Iran gains leverage, China and Russia stake diplomatic claims, and India must manage security priorities with strategic ties to Tehran.
At this dangerous maritime chokepoint, shipping companies and policymakers must decide whether to fund costly armed escorts and adding around $100,000 per voyage for insurance and escort services or risk insecure transit through one of the world’s most vital yet volatile sea lanes.
